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INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY 
This is a simple negligence case requiring the reversal of a summary judgment. The case 
involves an excited dog whose leash was not being held that jumped up on an elderly man 
(Appellant Richard Braese, Jr.) in a convenience store (of the Respondent) causing injury. Video 
surveillance cameras show the excited dog jumping up and putting its paws on the counter six or 
seven times before the Appellant Richard Braese, Jr. entered the store. The excited dog was 
jumping up to get dog treats which were kept behind the counter and fed to patrons' dogs by the 
store's clerk. It was clear that the dog was excited and out-of-control and should have been 
removed from the store in keeping with the Respondent's voluntarily-adopted policy. It was 
foreseeable that the excited dog might jump up on a patron causing injury, yet the convenience 
store cashier permitted the dog to stay in the store and did not require its owner to pick up the 
leash and hold the excited dog so that it could not jump up on the counter or other patrons. The 
District Court invaded the province of the jury in granting the convenience store summary 
judgment holding that it had no duty to Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence case involving injury sustained by a business invitee when an excited 
and out-of-control dog-being fed treats by a shop keeper behind the checkout counter of a 
convenience store-jumped up on a man in his eighties and caused him injuries. 
THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A complaint was filed in this case against Defendant/Respondent Stinker Stores, Inc. on 
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February 6, 2012.1 Respondent Stinker Stores, Inc. filed an Answer to the Complaint on May 4, 
2012.2 Respondent Stinker Stores, Inc. obtained leave to join the dog owner, Bryce Fuller, as a 
third party defendant, and obtained entry of default and default judgment against him.3 
Respondent Stinker Stores, Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment that was granted by the 
Appellant Braese filed an amended complaint naming Bryce Fuller as a Defendant. 5 
Default Judgment Against Bryce M Fuller was entered on Appellant Braese' s Amended 
Complaint.6 The Default Judgment Against Bryce M Fuller was certified as the final judgment 
was entered by the District Court on July 30, 2013. Appellant Braese timely filed a notice of 
appeal on August 6,2013. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time of the incident in this case, Respondent Stinker Stores, Inc. owned and 
operated a convenience store located at 1620 N. 13th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702. Respondent 
Stinker Stores, Inc. identified that store as Stinker Station Number 32. This particular store is 
referred to for convenience hereinafter simply as the "Stinker Store." On the date of the incident 
in this case, August 6, 2011, the Stinker Store had a practice of feeding customer's dogs treats 
kept behind the check out counter in its store located in the Hyde Park neighborhood in Boise, 
1 CR 8-13. 
2 CR 14-20. 
3 CR27-32. 
4CR207-219. 
5 CR 119-130. 
6 CR 226-227. Defendant Fuller filed for Bankruptcy in United States Bankruptcy for the District ofIdaho, 
Case 13-01899-JDP. 
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Idaho.7, 8, 9 The Stinker Store was a Licensed Food Establishment, licensed by the Central Health 
Department. 10 This practice violated the Idaho Food Code. II 
As might be expected, the Respondent's corporate management denied recognizing any 
risk to customers at all, but Respondent's Retail Operation's Manager, Jon Mangum, admitted 
being aware that dogs jumped up on the counters in its stores. 12 Mr. Mangum testified: 
7 The following documents and their attached exhibits contained in the Augmented Record are exhibits 
attached to Plaintiffs Motion to Augment Record (filed November 20, 2013) and Renewed Motion to Augment 
Record and Suspend Briefing Schedule (filed December 12, 2013): 
Exhibits attached to Motion to Augment Record 
Affidavit Of Tom Schmalz And Certification Of 
Business Records Or Regularly Conducted Activity 
Affidavit of Plaintiff regarding Damages 
Default Judgment against Bryce M Fuller 
Order on damages 
Exhibits attached to Renewed Motion to Augment Record 
Affidavit ofWm Breck Seiniger, Jr. In Support of 
Motion to Amend Complaint 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to 
Amend to State a Claim for Punitive Damages 
February 11, 2013 
July 3, 2013 
July 30,2013 
July 30,2013 
February 11, 2013 
February 28,2013 
7 CR 187. See, video Affidavit of Susie Wilson in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "Wilson 
Af!'), ExhibitA. CR 151-153. See also Affidavit ofTflll Breck Seiniger, Jr. In Support of Motion to Amend 
Complaint (hereafter "Seiniger Aff.'), Exhibits 2 and 3 (mistakenly identified in the documents footer as 
"Affidavit of Tom Schmalz and Certificationf of Business Records or Regularly Conducted Activity",) and 
Affidavit of Tom Schmalz and Certificationf of Business Records or Regularly Conducted Activity (hereafter 
"Schmalz Aff.') and its attached exhibits. 
8 Seiniger Aff. Exhibit 1, Deposition of Respondent Stinker Store, Pg: 17 Ln: 5-1. Aff. Of Counsel In Opposition to 
Motion to Amend to State a Claim for Punitive Damages (hereafter "Mahoney 1st Af!') Exhibit B, Deposition of 
Susie Wilson, Pg: 26 Ln: 9 to Pg: 27 Ln: 3; Wilson Af!, ExhibitA. CR 151-153. 
9 Aff. Of Counsel In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment (hereafter "Mahoney 2nd Aff.'), Exhibit A, Wilson 
Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 - Pg: 33 Ln: 9, CR 145. 
l°Id. 
11 Schmalz Aff., Exhibit attached to Motion to Augment Record. It is the position of Appellant Braese that the 
violation of the Idaho Food Code is circumstantial evidence of a general attitude of carelessness, but Appellant 
Braese does not contend that its violation was negligence per se in this case, since the statute was not 
intended to protect individuals from dog attacks. 
12 Seiniger Af!, Exhibit 1, Depo. of Stinker Stores, Inc. Pg. 15 In. 18 to Pg. 16 In. 12, Exhibit attached to Renewed 
Motion to Augment Record. 
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Q. Prior to the incident involving Mr. Braese, did Stinker have any concern that its 
patrons could be injured by people's animals that were permitted to corne in the store? 
A. Could you repeat that? I'm sorry. 
MR. SEINIGER: Can you read that back, Dean. 
THE COURT REPORTER: "Prior to the incident involving Mr. Braese, did Stinker 
have any concern that its patrons could be injured by people's animals that were 
permitted to corne in the store?" 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. SEINIGER: 
Q. Okay. So, I'm assuming that Stinker didn't have any policy to try and prevent any such 
accidents; would that be correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. Were animals permitted to -- for lack of a better way to say it -- jump up on the 
counter, put their paws on the counter? 
A. They did. Yeah. I would say that it happened. 
However, the manager of the store in question made admissions regarding foreseeability 
and the voluntary assumption of a duty to protect customers. Respondent's Manager admitted 
that she understood the dogs posed a risk of injuring people. 13 Respondent's Manager Suzie 
Wilson testified that Stinker Store had voluntarily adopted rules regarding dogs, consistent with 
her admission that there that there is always a risk that a dog can startle someone by barking or 
anything like that. 14 
These rules were conveyed to Stinker Store employees prior to August 6, 2011. From the 
beginning of Ms. Wilson's tenure as a manager at the Stinker Store dogs had to be on a leash and 
they could not be "unruly." The dogs had to be "controllable." Ms. Wilson specifically advised 
her employees to remove unruly dogs from the premises: 
Q. I want to talk to you a minute or two about your rules for your employees in the Stinker 
store regarding dogs. Did you have rules that you had put in place --
13 Id., Wilson Depo. Pg: 38 Ln: 10 - 18. CR 146. 
14 Id" Wilson Depo. Pg: 37 Ln: 9 - Pg: 38 Ln: 3. CR 146. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. -- to your employees regarding allowing dogs in the store prior to August 6th, 2011? 
A. Yes. From the beginning that I've been at that store, the dogs had to be on a leash and 
they could not be unruly dogs. They had to be dogs that were controllable. We did have 
some customers that I really made mad because I would not allow them to bring their 
dogs into the store because they did not look controllable to me. 
Q. In this regard, what did you specifically advise your employees during the 12 years 
you were manager prior to August 6th, 2011 ? 
A. Make them take their dogs outside if they're uncontrollable, and especially if they're 
not on a leash. IS 
The significant events in this case were recorded by multiple security cameras located at 
a variety of vantage points within the store. The video recordings made by Respondent were 
entered by it into evidence as Exhibit A to the affidavit of Respondent's Manager Suzie Wilson. 16 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Susie Wilson in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment17 is a 
computer disk containing video recordings of the incident in this case made by Respondent 
Stinker Store. These recordings are referred to hereafter as "the Surveillance Videos." For the 
convenience of the District Court and potentially this Court, Appellant Braese reviewed the 
Surveillance Videos and identified a series of photographs extracted from the Surveillance 
Videos showing the actions of the excited dog. These photographs are time stamped, and are 
attached to Appellant Braese' s affidavit as Exhibit 1.18,19 
15 Wilson Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 to Pg: 33 Ln: 16. Emphasis supplied. 
16 Wi/sonA/f, Exhibit A. CR 151-153. 
17 Affidavit of Plaintiff Opposing Summary Judgment (hereafter "Braese Af!"), CR 185-187, '1]"'1]"4-14. 
18 Braese Aff., CR 185-192. 
19 Appellant Braese's affidavit idenifies each picture, each of which bears a time stamp allowing the Court to 
get a sense of the time frames involved in the numerous times that the dog jumped up on the counter before it 
jumped up on Appellant Braese. Braese Aff, CR 186-187. The first photograph shows that the dog's owner is 
not holding the leash of his dog. The next eight photographs on pages 1-3 of Exhibit 1 show the dog with his 
paws on the counter. CR 188-190. 
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When Appellant Braese entered the Stinker Store, Bryce Fuller had been in it for some 
time with his dog. Respondent Stinker Store's Survellance Videos evidence the fact that prior to 
Appellant Braese entering the store, the excited dog jumped up on the counter approximately 
seven times just before the incident in which Appellant Braese was injured?O The manager of 
the Stinker Store, Suzie Wilson, testified that she was familiar with the dog that jumped up on 
the counter, and that this was typical of his behavior.21 On the sixth time that the excited dog 
jumped on the counter prior to Appellant Braese entering the store, it was fed a dog treat by the 
cashier. 22,23 
The excited dog had on a leash, but no one was holding it.24 
Respondent Stinker Store knew that it had the right to tell people to hold the leash, but it 
chose not to do so: 
Q. Okay. You as -- Stinker as the property owner has the right to tell people if they are 
going to be on your property they have to have their dog on a leash, doesn't it? 
A. Yes, we do. 
Q. But that's just something that you don't choose to do? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. And you didn't choose to do it then and you don't choose to do it now? 
A. That is correct.25 
20 WilsonAff,ExhibitA, CR 151-153. 
21 Mahoney Aff., Exhibit A, Wilson Depo. Pg. 40 In. 11-23. 
22 WilsonAff., ExhibitA, CR 185-192. 
23 If the Court reviews the surveillance videos attached to the affidavit of Susie Wilson it will see that the dog 
jumped up approximately 7 times on the counter, including one time (the sixth time jumped up on the 
counter) when he was being fed by the cashier. These instances are also shown on page 2 of Exhibit 1 to 
Appellant Braese affidavit. CR 189. 
24 Braese Aff, CR 187, see photographs attached as Exhibit 1, CR 188-191. Wilson Aff. ExhibitA. CR 185-192. 
25 Mahoney Aff, Exhibit B, Respondent Stinker Store Depo. Pg: 23 Ln: 3-13, CR 150. 
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Appellant Braese, a gentleman in his eighties, entered the Stinker Store to purchase a 
lottery ticket.26 As Appellant Braese entered the store, store patron Bryce Fuller was standing at 
the checkout counter with his dog next to him.27 As evidenced by the video on Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Suzie Wilson entitled" Video At Back Corner Of Store During Incident" the excited 
dog jumped up repeatedly on the counter, the dog is not under the owner's control or held by its 
leash, and that the cashier does not appear to do anything to try to stop the dog or to get the 
owner to control the dog. 28 The dog was unknown to the Appellant Braese.29 
Appellant Braese walked behind Mr. Fuller and approached the cashier to make 
payment. 30 The excited dog jumped up on Appellant Braese, causing him to become startled and 
Appellant Braese reflexively jerked backwards into a rack in the store.31 Appellant Braese was 
very concerned because he was recovering from a prior back injury at the time and the dog's 
paws on his chest were in immediate proximity to the external port of his pacemaker.32 
26 Braese AfJ., CR 186. Appellant Braese age is stated in the complaint, CR 10 'lf12, but is not stated in his 
affidavit. Appellant Braese age is evidenced in his medical records attached as Exhibits to his Affidavit of 
Plaintiffre: Damages, item 4 attached to Appellant's Motion to Augment Record filed November 20, 2013. 
27 Braese Aft, CR 186. Wilson AfJ.. Exhibit A. CR 185-192. 
28 Affidavit of Suzie Wilson in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, CR 151-153. The video 
recordings offered by Respondent evidence the fact that Mr. Braese walked around Mr. Fuller and his dog, 
that he was on the opposite side of the dog and paid the cashier, and that is only after this that the dog goes 
around its owner and jumps up on Mr. Braese twice. (See video entitled "Video Over Counter Good View Of 
Incident".). If the Court wishes to look at the video entitled "Video At Door During The Incident," the Court will 
clearly see that the dog is not being held on leash prior to the time that Mr. Braese enters the store. This is 
the only video that has audio. In this video, one can see that that the dog is clearly not only the verbal 
command of the owner and that the cashier is doing nothing to keep the dog jumping up on the counter. 
29 Braese AfJ., CR 187, VII. 
30 WilsonA/t. ExhibitA. CR 185-192. 
31 Braese AfJ., CR 187, V8, 9. As illustrated in the bottom two photographs on page 4 and all three photographs 
on page 5 of Exhibit 1. See the bottom photograph on page 3 and all of the photographs on page 4 of Exhibit 
1. Braese AfJ., CR 190-191. Wilson AfJ.. ExhibitA. CR 185-192. 
32 Braese AfJ., CR 187, VI2-13. 
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Appellant Braese immediately felt pain as a result of this incident.33 
Appellant Braese injured himself during this process, though he did not know to what 
extent until he received medical attention.34 While Appellant Braese was struggling with the 
excited dog and falling backward, the surveillance video shows the store manager watch the 
incident and walk behind Appellant Braese to the office without stopping to help him or making 
any attempt to enforce any store policies described by the Stinker Store's Manager, Ms. Wilson, 
described below. 35 The videos placed in evidence by Respondent show that the owner had the 
excited dog under control and held by a leash only after it jumped up on Mr. Braese.36 
The deposition of Respondent Stinker Store was taken pursuant to LR.Civ.P. 30(B)(6). 
Respondent Stinker Stores testified: 
Q. Did you talk to the person behind the counter? 
A. In a situation kind of like this, yeah. Briefly. 
Q. Okay. What did he tell you about what happened? 
A. After I watched the video and kind of talked to him is (sic.) the customer came in, sat 
down, paid for his stuff. At the time they were handing dog treats to the dog, the dog 
jumped -- jumped -- put his feet on the thing, he handed him a dog treat, the dog sat back 
down. Then Mr. Braese walks into the store, comes around, reaches around the dog to 
buy a lottery ticket, the dog turned around and jumped up and that's when Mr. Braese 
stepped back and ran into a low rack.37 
Stinker Store had adopted rules regarding dogs. These rules were conveyed to Stinker 
Store employees prior to August 6,2011. Dogs in the Respondent's stores had to be on a leash 
33 Braese Aff, CR 187, '[12. 
34 Id., CR 187, '[13. Affidavit of Plaintiff Regarding Damages, '['[ 3-9, 16-44, Exhibit attached to Motion to 
Augment Record. 
35 BraeseAff, CR 187, '[14. Wilson Aff. ExhibitA. CR 185-192. 
36 Wilson Aff, Exhibit A. CR 151-153. 
37 Seiniger Aff, Exhibit 1, Depo. of Stinker Stores, Inc. Pg. 17 Ln: 5-17, Exhibit attached to Renewed Motion to 
Augment Record. 
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and they could not be "unruly" to protect customers, employees, merchandise and "everything." 
The dogs had to be "controllable . .,38 As a result of the dog attack, Appellant Braese sustained 
Past Medical damages of $5,293.20 and Future Medical Damages of $5,000?9 A detailed 
description of Appellant Braese's injuries and medical treatment is contained in the Affidavit of 
Plaintiff Regarding Damages. 40 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court Err In Granting Summary Judgment? 
1.1 Did Respondent Stinker Store have a duty of due care towards the Appellant 
under the circumstances reflected in the record? 
1.2 Did Respondent Stinker Store voluntarily assume a duty towards the Plaintiff and 
similarly situated patrons of the store? 
1.3 Should Summary Judgment have been denied because the record contains 
material issues of fact as to general negligence? 
ARGUMENT 
Standards Applicable To Motions For Summary Judgment 
In order for the moving party to prevail in summary judgment, it must establish the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact on an element of a non-moving party's case 
through evidence. Thompson v. 10. Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034, 
1038 (1994). If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence 
38 Mahoney Aft, Wilson Depo. ExhibitA, Pg: 32 Ln: 15 - Pg: 33 Ln: 9; Pg: 37 Ln: 1- 8. CR 144-146. 
39 Order on Damages 1-2, Exhibit attached to Motion to Augment Record. 
40 Affidavit of PIa in tijf Regarding Damages, Exhibit attached to Motion to Augment Record. 
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establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not 
shift to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with 
supporting evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No.2, 918 P. 2d 583, 588 (Idaho, 
1996). Statements that are conclusory or speculative cannot satisfy either the requirement of the 
admissibility or competency under LR.C.P. 56(e). Delaney v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 2002 Westlaw 433638 (Idaho, 2002). A summary judgment is appropriate only where 
the record shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. LR.C.P.56(c). The burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the party 
moving for summary jUdgment. Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State of 
Idaho, 132 Idaho 559, 564, 976 P.2d 913 (1998). 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Petricevich 
v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868,452 P.2d 362,365 (1969). The adverse party, 
however, may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. LR.C.P. 56(e). Therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment 
when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A. 61 P.3d 557,562 (Idaho, 2002). Accord, Badell v. 
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
Respondent Stinker Store Had A General Duty of Due Care Towards Its Patrons 
This case is based upon Respondent Stinker Store's active negligence. There is no 
dispute that Appellant Braese's Complaint and Amended Complaint alleged negligence. "The 
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elements of a common law negligence action are (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the Defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 
damage." O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49,52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005) quoting Black 
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76,804 P.2d 
900,904-05 (1991). 
Because the dog attack on Appellant occurred in a store, Respondent Stinker Store argued 
below that it was not liable under a theory of premises liability. Appellant Braese agreed 
because the case did not involve a condition on the land. CR 214. Nevertheless, the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment discusses the theory of 
premises liability at great length, and it would appear that the District Court's analysis of duty 
was based upon a confused reading ofIdaho's premises liability cases CR 213-215. 
Only in the penultimate paragraph of its analysis does the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment corne around to analyzing Appellant Braese's 
general negligence claim, and at that point, its analysis drifts into confusion: 
Based on the facts above and the admissible evidence at this hearing, Stinker Stores was 
never informed of any dangerous propensities of Fuller's dog. Although Braese testified 
he suffered injury as a result of the subject incident, there is no indication from the 
testimony, the video, or otherwise that Braese's injuries were substantial. Indeed, the 
video shows Braese moving and acting the same before and after Fuller's dog jumped 
onto him. The degree of foreseeability appears to be low because Stinker Stores had no 
knowledge of any dangerous propensities of Fuller's dog. The Plaintiff contends that the 
dog jumping on the counter as seen in the video should have placed Stinker Stores on 
notice of the dangerous propensities of this particular dog. The court does not find this to 
be a case where there was a great foreseeability of harm. The court only engages in 
balancing the harms in rare situations where the court is called upon to extend a duty 
beyond the scope previously imposed ... which in this case is premises liability which the 
court has already determined does not apply to Stinker Stores. In engaging in this 
balancing ofharrn beyond premises liability, this court finds Stinker Stores did not owe a 
general duty to protect Braese from Fuller's dog in this case based upon all admissible 
evidence presented at this summary judgment proceeding. 
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Before discussing the District Court's reasoning, it must be noted that in reaching its 
decision, the District Court ignored entirely Appellant Braese's citation to the record and 
applicable Idaho authority concerning Respondent Stinker Store's (1) admission that it was 
familiar with the dog in question (and the inference raised concerning its character by its video-
recorded behavior notwithstanding Ms. Wilson's self-serving denials regarding the dog's nature), 
(2) admissions regarding its practice of feeding dogs treats from behind the counter, (3) the video 
evidence showing that the dog was in a state of excitation and was repeatedly jumping up 
precipitated by the clerk feeding it treats from behind the counter, and (4) Respondent's 
admissions concerning its voluntarily assumed duty, discussed at length below. CR 176. 
The District Court apparently concluded that harm was not foreseeable, contrary to 
Respondent Stinker Store's own policy that dogs in the store had to be on a leash, could not be 
"unruly," and had to be "controllable" to protect customers, employees, merchandise and 
"everything." Respondent Stinker Store's manager admitted to the necessity of keeping unruly 
dogs, especially those not restrained by a leash, out of the store: 
Q. I want to talk to you a minute or two about your rules for your employees in the 
Stinker store regarding dogs. Did you have rules that you had put in place -
A. Yes. 
Q. -- to your employees regarding allowing dogs in the store prior to August 6th, 2011? 
A. Yes. From the beginning that I've been at that store, the dogs had to be on a leash 
and they could not be unruly dogs. They had to be dogs that were controllable. We did 
have some customers that I really made mad because I would not allow them to bring 
their dogs into the store because they did not look controllable to me. 
Q. In this regard, what did you specifically advise your employees during the 12 years 
you were manager prior to August 6th, 2011 ? 
A. Make them take their dogs outside if they're uncontrollable, and especially if they're 
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not on a leash. 41 
Q. . ... Now, one ofthe things that you said with respect to your own employees, the 
dogs had to be on a leash and they couldn't be unruly and that was to protect the 
customers; is that correct? 
A. Protect everything, yeah, protect everything, the employees, customers and 
merchandise, stuff in the store, yeah. 42,43 
This case does not involve the extension of a new previously unrecognized duty to a 
business. The general duty of a business owner with respect to the conduct of its business is 
well-settled in Idaho. Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to "prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Sharp v. WH 
Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300, 796 P.2d 506,509 (1990); Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 
247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). The foregoing admissions made by the very manager of the 
Respondent Stinker Store in question can leave little doubt as to foreseeability. More to the 
point, however, is the fact that the duty not to entice dogs to become excited and jump up in an 
area populated by customers is not an extension of a duty previously unknown in the law. It is a 
matter of common sense. Consequently, the balancing test engaged in by the District Court was 
unnecessary. This Court has repeatedly held that premises liability is not the exclusive source of 
41 Mahoney Aft, Exhibit A, Wilson Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 - Pg: 33 Ln: 9. 
421d. Pg: 37 Ln: 1 - 8. 
43 Respondent Stinker Store witnesses contradicted one another with respect to its policies. When the 
corporation was deposed pursuant to I.R.Civ.P. 30(b) (6) its designee testified: 
"Q. Prior to the incident involving Mr. Braese, did Stinker have any concern that its patrons could be 
injured by people's animals that were permitted to come in the store?" 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. SEINIGER:Q. Okay. So, I'm assuming that Stinker didn't have any policy to try and prevent 
any such accidents; would that be correct?A. That is correct.Q. Okay. Were animals permitted to--
for lack of a better way to say it -- jump up on the counter, put their paws on the counter? A. They 
did. Yeah. I would say that it happened." 
Seiniger Aft, Exhibit 1, Stinker Station Depo Pg. 15 Ln. 24 to Pg. 25 Ln. 12, Exhibit attached to Renewed Motion 
to Augment Record .. 
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duties where a landowner is involved. Instead, circumstances may give rise to a general duty of 
care owed to third parties. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244 at 247-48,985 P.2d 669 at 672-73 
(1999). Boots ex reI. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 2008).44 
"We only engage in a balancing of the harm in those rare situations when we are called upon to 
extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or when a duty has not previously been 
recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846,908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995). Appellant submits 
that Rife and sound judicial policy discourage revisiting the issue of duty in the context of a 
business and applying the Rife factors in every negligence case brought against a business owner. 
In most cases the general definition of duty contained in Sharp and Turpen sufficiently defines 
the duty owed. Holding otherwise invites revisiting the concept of duty in every case involving a 
business and invites unnecessary appeals in which the business owner argues "Idaho has never 
held that a duty exists under these facts." When, as here, a business owner is sued for the kind of 
negligence that is actionable in other contexts, such as claims against dog owners themselves, 
examining the Rife factors is not warranted. 
No duty analysis involving the Rift factors was implicated by the facts of this case, 
particularly because Respondent Stinker Store had voluntarily undertaken a duty as evidenced by 
its foregoing admissions and the analysis below. However, even if it were, the conclusion 
reached by the District Court is not supported by the teachings of Rife and its progeny. In 
determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, several factors are to be considered. 
Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247,985 P.2d at 672. The factors include the foreseeability of harm to the 
Plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the Plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
44 Boots is a case which considered and rejected liability on the part of a landowner. However, Boots makes it 
clear that the determination of duty is to be made on a case-by-case basis of the facts. 
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between the Defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
Defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
Defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Id.; Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995). Where the degree or result of 
harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is 
required. Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248,985 P.2d at 673; Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 
509-10. "Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such 
injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 
985 P.2d at 673; Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d at 510. "We engage in a balancing of the 
harm only in those rare situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope 
previously imposed or when a duty has not previously been recognized." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 
248,985 P.2d at 673. 
Looking at the Rife factors, was it foreseeable that an excited dog that jumped up on a 
counter six times might also jump up on an elderly patron? Of course it was. There is no 
question that Appellant Braese suffered some injury, and there is a close connection between the 
Defendant's conduct and the injury suffered. 
The moral blame attached to the Defendant's conduct is the same as in any other typical 
negligence case, and in this case there is more moral blame because the Defendant was flouting 
the Idaho Food Code that prohibited dogs from being in the store in the first place.45 The policy 
of preventing future harm is obvious, and the extent of the burden to the Defendant and 
45 Appellant Braese acknowledges that violation of the Idaho Food Code does not constitute negligence per se 
in this instance, because the relevant statute is intended to protect against a different harm than that suffered 
by Appellant Braese. Nevertheless, it is indicative of a general level of disregard for safety. 
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consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for 
the breach is diminished, if not nonexistent, because the dog was not allowed on the premises in 
the first place because of the Idaho Food Code's prohibition against it being there. There is no 
factual issue as to the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Consequently, all of the Rife factors are satisfied with respect to imposing a duty in this case. 
Finally, the District Court's gratuitous observation that Appellant Braese did not appear 
to be seriously injured is irrelevant to analysis under Rife, since the degree of injury actually 
suffered is not one of its factors. The District Court observed that "[a]lthough Braese testified he 
suffered injury as a result of the subject incident, there is no indication from the testimony, the 
video, or otherwise that Braese's injuries were substantial. Indeed, the video shows Braese 
moving and acting the same before and after Fuller's dog jumped onto him." There was no 
indication of the severity of his injuries, because they were not germane to the issues raised by 
Respondent Stinker Store's Motion for Summary Judgment, and therefore it was unnecessary for 
the Appellant to make a record of the severity of his damages at that stage of the proceedings. 
Appellant Braese was seriously injured, as the District Court concluded when she heard his 
motion for entry of default judgment, and granted him $5,293,20 in past special damages and 
$5,000 in future medical damages.46,47 
46 Appellant Braese was seriously injured, as the District Court concluded when she heard his motion for 
entry of default judgment, and granted him $5,293,20 in past special damages and $5,000 in future medical 
damages. Order on Damages 1-2, Exhibit attached to Motion to Augment Record. 
47 The District Court granted Appellant Braese less in general damages than in special damages, Order on 
Damages 1-2, and miscalculated the amount of the final judgment entered against Defendant Fuller. Default 
Judgment CR 226-227._Given the proof put on by Appellant Braese the amount of general damages appears 
to be conservative to the point of penuriousness, but is concededly within the bounds of discretion. Appellant 
Braese's Counsel cannot help but observe that in the present climate it may be a mistake not to demand a jury 
trial as to damages in the case of a default, though to do so a litigant would likely have to raise a constitutional 
challenge under Idaho Constitution Article 1 §7 to I.R.Civ.P. 55(b ) (2)'s apparent limitation of the 
determination of damages to the exclusive discretion of a Court 
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The District Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's General 
N egHgence Claim 
Appellant Braese does not contend that Respondent Stinker Store is liable to it under a 
theory of premises liability. Nevertheless, Appellant Braese contends that Respondent Stinker 
Store owed a general duty of due care to Appellant Braese on the day of the incident. See Turpin 
and Boots, supra. This liability arises from the active negligence of Stinker's cashier and not 
from a condition on the land. According to the affidavit of the Plaintiff, the following occurred. 
On or about 8/06/2011, Appellant Braese entered the Stinker Station Number 32 located at 1620 
N. 13th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 to purchase a lottery ticket. As Appellant Braese entered the 
store, there a was a man standing at the check out counter with an excited dog next to him. 
Appellant Braese reviewed the surveillance tapes provided by Respondent Stinker Stores in 
discovery, copies of which he understands to be contained on computer desk that is attached as 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Susie Wilson in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Attached 
to Appellant Braese's affidavit as Exhibit 1 is a series of photographs taken from the surveillance 
videos provided to him in discovery by Respondent Stinker Stores and to the Court as an exhibit 
to the Affidavit of Suzie Wilson. On page 1 of Exhibit 1 (to Appellant Braese's affidavit) the top 
photograph shows Defendant Bryce Fuller standing at the checkout counter of Stinker Store 
Number 32. The photograph shows that he is not holding the leash of his excited dog. 
The next two photographs on page 1 of Exhibit 1 show the dog with his paws on the 
counter. If the Court reviews the surveillance videos attached to the affidavit of Susie Wilson, it 
will see that the excited dog jumped up approximately seven times on the counter, including one 
time (the sixth time jumped up on the counter) when he was being fed by the cashier. These 
instances are also shown on page 2 of Exhibit 1. When Appellant Braese entered Stinker Store 
Number 32 on August 6,2011, he walked behind Mr. Fuller and approached the cashier to make 
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payment. See the bottom photograph on page 3 and all of the photographs on page 4 of Exhibit 
As illustrated in the bottom two photographs on page 4 and all three photographs on page 5 of 
Exhibit 1, the excited dog jumped up on Appellant Braese, causing him to become startled and 
reflexively jerked backwards into a rack in the store. To the best of Appellant Braese's 
knowledge the dog was not being held by his leash or otherwise restrained at any time prior to its 
attacking him. 
The dog was unknown to Appellant Braese. Appellant Braese immediately felt pain as a 
result of this incident and he hurt himself. Appellant Braese was very concerned because he was 
recovering from a prior back injury at the time and the dog's paws on his chest were in 
immediate proximity to the external port of his pacemaker. Appellant Braese injured himself 
during this process, though he did not know to what extent until he received medical attention. 
While Appellant Braese was struggling with the excited dog and falling backward, the 
surveillance video shows the store manager watch the incident and walk behind him to the office 
without stopping to help him or making any attempt to enforce any store policies described by 
Ms. Wilson in her deposition, as set forth below. 
If the Court reviews the videos that are attached to the affidavit provided to it by 
Defendant, it will see in the videos that the excited dog is not being held on a leash prior to its 
jumping up on Appellant Braese, and that it jumps up on the counter no less than seven times. 
The videos show the cashier feeding the excited dog the sixth time that it jumps up on the 
counter. The Court will also see that Appellant Braese walked around Mr. Fuller and his dog, 
that he was on the opposite side of the dog and paid the cashier, and that is only after this that the 
excited dog goes around its owner and jumps up on Appellant Braese twice. (See video entitled 
"Video Over Counter Good View Of Incident".) If the Court looks at the video entitled" Video At 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
-18-
Door During The Incident," the Court will clearly see that the dog is not being held on leash 
prior to the time that Appellant Braese enters the store. This is the only video that has audio. In 
this video, one can see that that the dog is clearly not under the verbal command of the owner 
and that the cashier is doing nothing to keep the excited dog from jumping up on the counter. It 
is also clear in the video entitled" Video At Back Corner Of Store During Incident" that the 
excited dog is jumping up repeatedly on the counter, that the excited dog is not under the 
owner's controller or being held by its leash, and that the cashier does not appear to do anything 
to try to stop the excited dog or to get the owner to control the dog. The videos show that the 
owner had the dog under control and held by a leash only after it has jumped up on Appellant 
Braese. 
Although Defendant Stinker attempts to rely upon the deposition of the manager, Ms. 
Wilson, she was not a witness to the incident. Nevertheless, her testimony does provide 
circumstantial evidence that indicates that Defendant Stinker recognized, or at least voluntary 
accepted, a duty that ran to Appellant Braese. Ms. Wilson understood that the Stinker Store she 
managed was licensed as a food establishment by the Central District Health Department. She 
had reviewed the Idaho Food Code.48 Notwithstanding the fact that dogs were not permitted in 
the store because it was a licensed "food establishment" subject to the Idaho Food Code, Stinker 
Corporation told her that dogs were allowed in the store.49 (It is Appellant's position that 
Respondent Stinker Stores' flouting of the Idaho Food Code prohibiting the dog in question from 
being in the store is circumstantial evidence of their general lack of due care for customers, even 
48 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Amend to State a Claim for Punitive Damages, Exhibit B, Pg: 24 
Ln: 2 22, Pg: 25 Ln: 21 - 25, Exhibit attached to Renewed Motion to Augment Record. 
49 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Amend to State a Claim for Punitive Damages, Exhibit B, Pg: 21 
Ln: 8 - 25, Exhibit attached to Renewed Motion to Augment Record. 
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if violation of the Idaho Food Code does not constitute negligence per se in this instance.) 
Respondent Stinker Store Voluntarily Assumed A Duty of Due Care To Its Patrons With 
Respect to Dogs 
Respondent's Manager Suzie Wilson testified that Stinker Store had adopted rules 
regarding dogs. These rules were conveyed to Stinker's employees prior to August 6, 2011. 
From the beginning of Ms. Wilson's tenure as a manager at the Stinker Store, dogs had to be on 
a leash and they could not be "unruly." The dogs had to be "controllable.,,5o Ms. Wilson 
testified that dogs had to be on a leash and could not be unruly to protect customers, employees, 
merchandise and "everything."sl Ms. Wilson acknowledged that there is always a risk that a dog 
can startle someone by barking or anything like that. 52 Ms. Wilson testified that she understood 
the dogs pose a risk of injuring people. 
The sum and substance of Ms. Wilson's testimony is that as manager of the Stinker Store 
in the Hyde Park historical district of Boise, she recognized the duty to protect patrons from 
unruly dogs, but that her attempts to do so were undermined by Stinker's corporate manager, Mr. 
Mangum, at least after the fact. The affidavit of Appellant Braese and the video supplied by the 
Defendant show that the dog in question was out-of-control, leaping up on the counter repeatedly 
and being fed by the cashier at the counter, in violation of the Stinker Store's own policy and 
common sense (not to mention the Idaho Food Code). The cashier could see that the excited dog 
was not on a leash, and was "unruly." Thus, permitting the excited dog to remain on the 
premises of Stinker Store number 32 was not only a violation of the common-law duty of due 
care, but also violated the rules adopted by Ms. Wilson for that Stinker Store that dogs within the 
50 Mahoney Aff., Exhibit A, Wilson Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 - Pg: 33 Ln: 9. 
SlId. Pg: 37 Ln: 1 - 8. 
52Id. Pg: 37 Ln: 9 - Pg: 38 Ln: 3. 
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store had to be on a leash and could not be "unruly."s3 As Ms. Wilson said, the store's rules 
were that the dogs had to be "controllable." Id. That rule is essentially meaningless unless it 
required the store's cashier to insist that Mr. Fuller keep his dog under control. Clearly, Stinker 
Store assumed the duty towards Mr. Braese and all similar customers. If one voluntarily 
undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a 
non-negligent manner. Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001); 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400, 987 P.2d 300,312 (1999). See also 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. Boots ex rei. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 395-
96, 179 P.3d 352,358-59 (Ct. App. 2008) 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Stinker Store is not entitled to summary judgment. Respondent Stinker Store 
had a common-law duty towards Appellant Braese, and it voluntarily assumed such a duty. The 
actions of the excited dog, as depicted in the Surveillance Videos, show that it was out-of-control 
and leaping up repeatedly on the counter. The dog was "unruly" and out of the control of the 
owner which was apparent to the cashier well before Mr. Braese was ever injured. Defendant 
Stinker Store's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed and this case remanded to the 
District Court for trial. 
53 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Wilson Depo., Exhibit A, Wilson 
Depo. Pg: 32 Ln: 15 - Pg: 33 Ln: 9. CR 145. 
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